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ABSTRACT 
This paper makes a contribution to the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and, in 
particular, to why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than alternative 
strategies. We first argue that it is vital to distinguish between asset-exploiting FDI and asset-
augmenting FDI, as the alternative strategies available to the firm differ in each case and hence 
the rationales for FDI must also differ. Furthermore, given the predominance of controlling 
shareholders (family, State, institutional) in many firms worldwide, we stress that MNE theory 
should embrace consideration of the different objectives, risk attitudes and decision-making 
time horizons of important stakeholders.  
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MNE Theory and the Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The various theories of the multinational enterprise (MNE) address the issue of why 
firms choose to extend their operations overseas through foreign direct investment (FDI) rather 
than via alternative strategies such as licensing or exports. Notwithstanding their differences in 
emphasis, the “traditional” theories of the MNE all view the MNE as an efficient institutional 
form for the cross-border exploitation of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) based upon assets 
such as technology, brands, marketing and management expertise1. But such theories have been 
challenged by the appearance of MNEs from the emerging economies (EMNEs) which appear 
not to possess significant FSAs and whose FDI typically involves the augmentation of existing 
FSAs by the acquisition of assets overseas rather than the exploitation of existing FSAs.  
This paper engages with this key issue of why firms choose FDI in preference to 
alternative strategies, and is purely theoretical in content. Our contention in this paper is that 
the traditional theories of the MNE are valuable, but are limited by their implicit 
conceptualization of the firm as a decision-making entity. Strategic decisions are not made by 
firms per se but rather through the interaction of various stakeholder constituencies taking into 
account the perceived opportunities, resources and capabilities available internally or 
externally to the firm. Such considerations apply to all strategic decisions, including the 
decision to expand overseas through FDI.  In short, the extant theories need to be extended to 
embrace consideration of the different objectives, risk attitudes and decision-making time 
horizons of important stakeholders – notably the shareholders – in order to make them more 
generally applicable. In many (advanced and emerging) economies which do not embrace the 
Anglo-American system of corporate governance, share ownership is often concentrated (in 
the hands of families, the State, or financial institutions), controlling shareholders exert 
considerable influence on firm strategy, the markets for corporate control are often thin or 
inactive, business groups are common, and short-term shareholder wealth maximization should 
not necessarily be assumed as the main corporate objective. Or, in other words, the 
incorporation of corporate governance considerations into existing MNE theories will permit 
their (better) applicability both to MNEs from advanced economies and to EMNEs 
                                                 
1 We use the term “traditional” to differentiate the long-standing theories of the MNE from the more recent theories 
which has been inspired by the growth of EMNEs – see the discussion in the next section. 
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Our argument in brief is that all FDI typically involves a substantial commitment of 
resources which may not yield positive returns for many years. The extended time periods, the 
one-off nature of most FDI projects, and the cross-border nature of the activities all result in 
high levels of uncertainty and risk. The required resources will typically include not only 
financial resources, but also entrepreneurial, managerial and knowledge assets, and thus 
involve different risk exposures. Now FDI may be either asset-exploiting or asset-augmenting, 
and the firm will be faced with different alternative strategies in each case. In the case of asset-
exploiting FDI (as considered by the traditional theories), the main alternative is licensing 
production to a domestic firm in the host economy (assuming that local production is required). 
In contrast, the principal alternative to asset-augmenting FDI will be the in-house development 
of the required resources and capabilities as it is unlikely that these will be obtainable through 
licensing arrangements. Each of these strategic alternatives involves different patterns of costs 
and returns over time, and thus involves different levels of risk and uncertainty. Now different 
stakeholder constituencies will typically have different objectives, different decision-making 
time horizons, and different attitudes towards risk. We thus conjecture that the choices made 
by firms between FDI and the alternative strategies will depend not just upon their extant FSAs 
and potential internalization advantages, but also crucially upon their ownership structures and 
other governance mechanisms. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first compare and contrast the key elements of 
five traditional theories of the multinational enterprise, viz: market power theory; 
internalization theory; the transaction cost theory; evolutionary theory; and the eclectic 
paradigm. Next we emphasise the limitations of the traditional theories, and summarise some 
of the main contributions to the literature on EMNEs, highlighting various stylised features of 
EMNEs and summarizing the attempts in the extant literature to embrace these distinctive 
features either by adapting the traditional theories or by developing new theories. In the third 
section, we contrast the characteristics of the knowledge-based assets transferred in asset-
exploiting FDI with those transferred in asset-augmenting FDI, and discuss the implications 
for the relative efficiencies of FDI and alternative institutional arrangements for effecting the 
transfers. In the following section, we consider how the firm’s ownership structure may 
influence the choice between FDI and the possible alternative strategies – and hence make an 
original contribution to the theory of the MNE. We start by discussing the meaning of 
efficiency in the context of strategic decision-making, and emphasise that it is necessary to 
consider the different objectives, decision-making time horizons, and attitudes towards risk of 
the various stakeholders involved. We thus propose that MNE theory should be extended to 
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take account of the ownership structures of firms (especially in those countries where corporate 
ownership and/or control is exercised by powerful family, State or institutional shareholders) 
and the extent to which managers have discretion to pursue their own objectives. Our approach 
is theoretical, but we conclude with a set of potentially testable propositions. The final section 
summarises the discussion, and briefly indicates how decision-making may be constrained by 
active markets for corporate control and by product market competition. 
 
THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
In this section, we outline the main elements of five important theories of the MNE, 
viz: market power theory, internalization theory; transaction cost theory; evolutionary theory; 
and the eclectic paradigm. We highlight the key insights of each theory, and emphasise two 
common limitations – that, in each theory, the firm is conceptualized as a risk-neutral decision-
making entity whose cross-border scope is determined by short-term efficiency considerations, 
and no consideration is given to the ownership structure of the firm. Such a conceptualization 
may have applicability in firms where the shareholders are widely-dispersed and managers may 
be assumed to pursue short-term profit-maximising or cost-minimising objectives. But in many 
economies, particularly emerging economies but also many advanced economies, concentrated 
share ownership and other forms of corporate ownership are the norm, and shareholders may 
have different objectives and different decision-making time horizons. In such cases, it is 
unrealistic to theorise that the most efficient outcome in the short-term is the one that will 
necessarily prevail. In short, we would argue that the theory of the MNE needs to embrace 
considerations of corporate governance. 
 
Market Power Theory 
Market power theory (Hymer, 1960, 1968, 1970; Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971) 
sought to explain the industrial composition of FDI, and why firms own or control productive 
facilities in foreign countries. Hymer (1960) highlights the fact that many industries are not 
perfectly competitive, but are beset by structural market imperfections due inter alia to 
economies of scale, government interventions, product differentiation, and other imperfections 
in goods and factor markets. Firms in such industries thus enjoy varying degrees of market 
power, and Hymer asserts that such firms will seek to enhance their market power by direct 
investment overseas. He notes that MNEs have to bear additional costs (including the costs of 
communication and acquisition of information, the costs and risks of exchange rate 
fluctuations, and costs due to less favourable treatment by host country governments) relative 
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to indigenous competitors. To prosper, MNEs must either have firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs) which they can exploit by FDI in foreign markets and thus enhance their market power, 
and/or acquire/collude so as to remove conflict with foreign competitors and increase market 
power. Hymer clearly believes that firms become MNEs to maximise the returns on their 
competitive advantages, but is ambivalent about the wider welfare effects. He notes (Hymer 
1970: 443) that ‘direct foreign investment thus has a dual nature. It is an instrument which 
allows business firms to transfer capital, technology, and organizational skill from one country 
to another. It is also an instrument for restraining competition between firms of different 
nations. [It is important to note] that the general presumption of international trade economists 
in favor of free trade and free factor movements, on the grounds of allocative efficiency, does 
not apply to direct foreign investment because of the anticompetitive effect inherently 
associated with it.’ 
 
Internalization Theory  
 Internalization theory (McManus, 1972; Buckley & Casson, 1976, 1998a, 1998b; 
Rugman, 1981) addresses the issue of why firms expand overseas through FDI (and thus 
become MNEs) rather than relying on arm’s length contractual arrangements (e.g. licensing) 
to service the foreign market. Buckley & Casson (1976) highlight the fact that the production 
of most goods and services involve a range of interdependent activities, which are connected 
by flows of intermediate products. These intermediate products include not only semi-
processed materials, but also various types of knowledge (R&D, marketing etc.) and expertise 
embodied in human capital, patents and other intangible assets. They emphasize that the 
markets for these intermediate products typically suffer from various transactional market 
imperfections, particularly when the activities are located in different countries, including: the 
costs of searching for, and negotiating contracts with, potential partners; buyer uncertainty 
about the value and nature of inputs; the costs of broken contracts, and litigation; the need to 
protect product quality and reputation; the absence of futures markets; inability to engage in 
practices such as transfer pricing and cross-subsidization, or to take advantage of government 
interventions, differential tax rates and exchange rate movements. These imperfections are 
particularly significant in the markets for knowledge-based assets and capabilities (e.g. R&D) 
and, in such cases, there is an incentive to forego any form of contractual arrangement and 
instead bring the activities under common ownership within an MNE.  
 It should, however, be noted that there are also internal transaction costs associated with 
organising the activities within the MNE. These internal transaction costs include the costs of 
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acquiring and transmitting information; the costs of communication about complementary 
actions or of providing for them to be combined; and the costs of incentive schemes to align 
the actions of the members of the firm with the objectives of the firm (Buckley & Strange, 
2011). The chosen governance structure will depend upon a comparison of the market 
transaction costs and the internal transaction costs, and the MNE will emerge as the efficient 
outcome if the market transaction costs exceed the internal transaction costs. 
 
The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise 
 The transaction cost (TC) theory of the MNE (Teece, 1977, 1986; Hennart, 1982, 2001) 
shares many similarities with internalization theory, including a common intellectual heritage 
in Coase (1937). But whereas internalization theory considers the relative efficiency of internal 
and external markets for intermediate products, transaction cost theory is more micro-analytic 
and focuses on the transaction as the basic unit of analysis. Hennart (2001) emphasises that the 
price system and hierarchy are two alternative methods of organising transactions between 
agents, and highlights the transaction (information, bargaining, and enforcement) costs 
involved in organising interactions between agents who are both boundedly rational and (at 
least some of whom) are opportunistic. Furthermore he stresses that these transaction costs 
vary according to whether the transaction is organised through the price system or through 
hierarchy. The price system will be an efficient method of organization when all outputs can 
be accurately measured (so that they accurately convey the value of goods and services to all 
agents), and if there are enough buyers and sellers so that prices are exogenous (and thus 
opportunities for bargaining are eliminated). But if outputs are difficult to measure, and small 
numbers of buyers and sellers render prices endogenous, then the combination of bounded 
rationality and opportunism means that monitoring and enforcement costs will be high, and 
hierarchy will be the favoured method of organization. The agents will be recruited on 
employment contracts (and thus become employees), and a centralized system of managerial 
directives will replace a decentralized price system. Agents will be rewarded based upon their 
behaviour (i.e. for obeying the directives), though there will also be limits to the efficiency of 
hierarchy because management has to be able to monitor effectively this behaviour. 
 Hennart (2001) suggests that the conditions favouring cross-border hierarchical 
organization (i.e. the creation of an MNE) exist a fortiori when the agents wish to effect the 
transfer of knowledge between countries. The markets for knowledge suffer from information 
asymmetries which give rise to the various problems identified above, and hence transfer under 
common control within the MNE is the efficient solution because both the provider and the 
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recipient of the knowledge then benefit from effective transfer. In short, ‘MNEs thrive when 
they are more efficient than markets and contracts in organizing interdependencies between 
agents located in different countries’ (Hennart, 2001: 132). 
Notwithstanding their differences in emphasis, both internalization theory and the 
transactions cost theory see the MNE as a response to market failure. Both approaches assert 
that firms internalize cross-border operations and thus become MNEs when they can thereby 
lower the costs of organizing and transacting business (Teece, 1986). Both approaches thus see 
cost minimization through the efficient exchange of intermediate products as the primary 
objective of the firm.  
 
The Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Enterprise 
 The evolutionary theory of the MNE has its origins in the resource-based and 
knowledge-based views of the firm. Kogut & Zander (1993) maintain that firms are social 
communities, and repositories of tacit knowledge embedded in their employees and in firm 
routines. They emphasise that firms compete on the basis of their knowledge and information, 
and on their ability to develop new knowledge through experiential learning, and that the 
possession of such ownership advantages (superior capabilities) is the primary explanation for 
FDI. Furthermore, they stress that the cross-border transfer of knowledge is not costless, and 
the inherent difficulties and associated costs rise the more tacit is the knowledge. The cross-
border transfer, recombination and exploitation of tacit knowledge can thus be accomplished 
most efficiently within the MNE. Kogut & Zander (1993: 625) thus take issue with the 
internalization and transaction costs explanations of the MNE, and assert that the ‘multinational 
corporation arises not out of the failure of markets for the buying and selling of knowledge, but 
out of its superior efficiency as an organizational vehicle by which to transfer this knowledge 
across borders.’ 
Notwithstanding the Kogut & Zander critique of the market failure explanation for the 
existence of the MNE, it is not clear that the evolutionary theory differs significantly from 
internalization theory – other than a difference of emphasis. Importantly, in the context of this 
paper, Kogut & Zander base their theory on the idea that MNEs are efficient mechanisms for 
the cross-border transmission and exploitation of knowledge. 
 
The Eclectic Paradigm  
The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1980, 1988; 1995; 2000) embraces the key 
insights of internalization/transaction cost theory, but also includes elements of trade theory 
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and the resource-based view. It is an attempt to provide a unified framework to explain the 
choice between FDI, exports and licensing as alternative modes of internationalization, and is 
couched in terms of ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) advantages. Ownership 
advantages are specific to the individual firm, and provide the firm with a competitive 
advantage relative to its rivals and which enables it to offset the additional costs and risks 
(relative to indigenous rivals) of operating in foreign countries. Location advantages are 
specific to particular countries, and relate to why one country may be preferred to another as a 
production site: Dunning lists inter alia transport and communications costs; government 
interventions; controls on imports (including tariff barriers); tax rates, incentives, climate for 
investment, and political stability; infrastructure (commercial, legal, transportation); and 
psychic distance. Internalization advantages refer to the benefits from circumventing 
transactional market imperfections, and coordinating cross-border activities within the firm 
rather than relying on arm’s length contractual arrangements. FDI is assumed to occur (and 
hence the firm becomes multinational) when the firm possesses ownership advantages, 
production in a foreign location is preferable to home country production (hence FDI is 
preferred to exports), and there are significant internalization advantages (hence FDI is 
preferred to licensing). Dunning (2000a: 167) concedes that initially ‘the eclectic paradigm 
primarily addressed static and efficiency [emphasis added] related issues’, but claimed that his 
later extensions gave more attention to dynamic considerations. 
 
Comments on the Traditional Theories 
 The role of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) differs subtly in each of the traditional 
theories. Such FSAs are central to the market power theory, the evolutionary theory and the 
eclectic paradigm, as they provide the underlying asset-exploiting rationale for why the firms 
are contemplating the establishment of production in foreign countries. In contrast, the 
possession of FSAs is not considered a prerequisite for becoming an MNE in internalization 
theory and the transaction cost theory, as internalization advantages alone are considered to 
provide a sufficient basis for an MNE to supersede less efficient market transactions. FSAs are 
still an important part of the story, however, but both internalization theory and the transaction 
cost theory effectively conflate the asset-exploiting and asset-augmenting motivations for FDI 
and so provide little guidance as to which party will take the initiative in internalizing the 
transactions. 
But the five traditional theories also have many complementarities and similarities. 
First, all five theories address the issue of the alternatives to production overseas by the MNE. 
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The market power theory contrasts overseas production by the MNE (or by a licensee) with 
production by a local firm, which is replaced in whole or in part by the presence of the 
MNE/licensee. The eclectic paradigm considers the choice between exports, licensing and FDI 
as alternative modes for servicing the overseas market. In contrast, both internalization theory 
and the transaction cost theory provide parsimonious explanations of why MNEs arise rather 
than overseas production being effected through a licensing arrangement. Our discussion below 
will follow in this tradition and consider the advantages and disadvantages of FDI (and hence 
the MNE) in comparison to the possible strategic alternatives. Second, the firm in each theory 
is conceptualized as a decision-making entity, with no consideration given to the different 
objectives, risk attitudes and decision-making time horizons of important stakeholders – 
notably the shareholders. Yet shareholders, and especially controlling shareholders, do exert 
influence on strategic decision-making. Consider a state-owned enterprise that is privatised, or 
a private firm that is nationalised. Do we expect the same strategic decisions to be made in each 
firm before and after the changes in ownership? Alternatively, consider two firms with identical 
resources, capabilities etc. – one has widely-dispersed share ownership, whilst the other is 
family-owned. Do we expect the same strategic decisions to be made in each firm? Third, each 
of the theories envisages the cross-border scope of the firm as determined by short-term 
efficiency considerations. Yet efficiency in a decision-making context needs also to take 
account of the varying objectives of the various stakeholders, their attitudes towards risk, and 
their decision-making time horizons.  
 
THE NEED FOR NEW THEORY 
 Our contention is thus that the traditional theories of the MNE all suffer from two major 
limitations which restrict their applicability, viz: a failure to distinguish explicitly between 
asset-exploiting FDI and asset-augmenting FDI, and a failure to take account of the ownership 
structures of the MNEs. These limitations are not important when academic attention is focused 
on US/UK MNEs in possession of significant FSAs but, as attention has shifted to MNEs from 
countries with different corporate governance systems and in particular to EMNEs, the 
significance of these limitations has become ever more apparent. 
 In the case of EMNEs, various authors have identified a number of stylized facts about 
EMNEs which pose a challenge to the extant theories. First, many EMNEs are “latecomers” 
that do not appear to possess significant FSAs based upon traditional assets such as technology, 
brands, management and marketing expertise. Second, much of the FDI undertaken by EMNEs 
into advanced economies involves the acquisition of host country firms (and their assets), rather 
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than the exploitation of prior FSAs. Third, the institutional environments in the home countries 
of many EMNEs are weaker than those in more advanced economies, with the result that firms 
are often highly-integrated, and corporate ownership is often highly concentrated and 
characterised by the presence of business groups. These stylised facts cannot be easily 
accommodated within the traditional theories of the MNE. In particular, the fact that EMNEs 
apparently lack transferable FSAs is at odds with the assumptions of the market power theory, 
the evolutionary theory, and the eclectic paradigm.  
Two different strands of literature have emerged in response to this conundrum. The 
first strand has attempted to amend the traditional theories, primarily by identifying and 
conceptualizing additional FSAs possessed by EMNEs. For instance, various authors (e.g. 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009) have suggested that EMNEs possess 
distinctive FSAs that are typically different from those observed in MNEs from developed 
economies. The second strand of literature has asserted that special theories need to be 
developed to explain the activities of EMNEs. For instance, Mathews (2006: 9) stressed that 
EMNEs from the Asia-Pacific had not possessed significant FSAs, but emphasised that 
‘latecomer firms see the world as full of resources to be tapped, provided the appropriate 
complementary strategies and organizational forms can be devised.’ In a similar vein, Luo & 
Tung (2007) highlight the competitive disadvantages of many EMNEs, and suggest that these 
latecomer EMNEs use internationalization as a “springboard” to acquire strategic assets (e.g. 
technology, brands, managerial expertise, distribution channels) overseas, whilst 
simultaneously reducing their vulnerability to market and institutional constraints at home. 
Child & Rodrigues (2005) focus on Chinese MNEs, and also suggest that the extant IB theory 
is too wedded to the idea of prior competitive advantage as a necessary condition for 
internationalization.  
We would argue, however, that no special theory is required to explain the emergence 
of EMNEs – though the advent of significant numbers of EMNEs has highlighted the need to 
extend the traditional theoretical perspectives in two ways. On the one hand, it is important to 
recognise that MNEs from all home countries sometimes engage in asset-exploiting FDI and 
sometimes in asset-augmenting FDI, and that the viable alternative strategies differ in each 
case. Asset-exploiting FDI is not the sole preserve of MNEs from advanced economies, and 
asset-augmenting FDI is equally not the sole preserve of EMNEs. On the other hand, it is 
essential to take account of the ownership structure of the firms undertaking FDI. If a firm is 
publicly-listed, the shares are widely-dispersed, and there is an active market for corporate 
control, then the strategic decisions undertaken by the firm (whether it is from an emerging 
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economy or an advanced economy) will be guided – in line with the traditional theories – by 
short-term efficiency considerations. By way of illustration, consider the case of a notable 
EMNE - Marcopolo S.A. (the Brazilian bus and coach manufacturer). In a speech to the 2015 
EIBA Conference, Mr Jose Rubens de la Rosa (the CEO) repeatedly emphasised that the firm’s 
main objective was the quarterly return on assets. However, if shareholdings are concentrated 
and the market for corporate control is inactive, then the strategic decisions undertaken by the 
firm (again whether it is from an emerging economy or an advanced economy) will reflect the 
objectives, attitudes to risk, and decision-making time horizons of the controlling shareholders 
as well the extant FSAs and potential internalization advantages. 
 
ASSET-EXPLOITING AND ASSET-AUGMENTING FDI 
In considering organizational learning, March (1991) differentiated between 
explorative knowledge activities (as would be involved in asset-augmenting FDI by EMNEs) 
and exploitative knowledge activities (as would be involved in asset-exploiting FDI). He noted 
that the ‘essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competences, 
technologies, and paradigms. Its returns are positive, proximate, and predictable. The essence 
of exploration is experimentation with new alternatives. Its returns are uncertain, distant, and 
often negative. Thus, the distance in time and space between the locus of learning and the locus 
for the realization of returns is generally greater in the case of exploration than in the case of 
exploitation, as is the uncertainty.’ He further stated that ‘compared to returns from 
exploitation, returns from exploration are systematically less certain, more remote in time, and 
organizationally more distant from the locus of action and adaption.’ 
In the context of the exploitative knowledge activities inherent in asset-exploiting FDI, 
the essential theoretical issue relates to the conditions under which FDI would be preferred to 
licensing the knowledge to a foreign licensee. The home country firm is the owner of the 
knowledge, and thus presumably has a reasonably good idea of its commercial value of its 
exploitation in foreign markets. The unknown considerations relate to the various transactional 
market imperfections noted above in our discussion of internalization theory, and these are 
likely to be most severe for knowledge-based assets and capabilities. In March’s terminology, 
the likely returns from the alternative options are likely to be positive, relatively predictable, 
and proximate – both in time and in terms of organization. Hence in comparison to the licensing 
alternative, asset-exploiting FDI (and hence multinationality) involves: 
 Greater investment in the short-term, and some delay (certainly in the case of greenfield 
FDI) before returns are generated. 
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 A less stable income stream. 
 A greater resource commitment and more uncertain cash flows, and hence higher risk 
(exacerbated by greater political, foreign exchange, cross-cultural etc risks). 
 Higher expected returns over the longer-term because of scale economies and 
organizational learning. 
In short, asset-exploitation FDI involves a higher resource commitment in the short-term (and 
higher risk exposure) than licensing, but leads to higher expected returns in the long-term. 
 What are the alternatives to asset-augmenting FDI? It is possible, but perhaps unlikely, 
that a foreign licensor could be found, especially for the types of superior knowledge-based 
assets and tacit capabilities (e.g. sophisticated technology, management and marketing 
expertise, well-known brand names) that are typically sought, and there might be additional 
issues related to the firm’s absorptive capacity. But there is another alternative, namely the in-
house development of these assets and capabilities. However, as March notes, the returns 
would be more diffuse, spread over longer time horizons, involve greater uncertainty and risk, 
and may well be negative. In comparison to this in-house alternative, asset-augmenting FDI 
(and hence multinationality) is likely to be a quicker vehicle for obtaining new resources and 
capabilities, and also have greater potential for longer-term upgrading and capacity building: 
 Greater investment in the short-term, but less delay before returns are generated 
(assuming the FDI is effected through acquisition). 
 A more stable income stream, as the acquired assets will be part of a going concern. 
 A greater resource commitment but more certain cash flows, and hence lower risk 
(notwithstanding the greater political, foreign exchange, cross-cultural etc risks). 
 Higher expected returns over the longer-term, especially if the FDI stimulates benefits 
through organizational learning. 
In short, asset-augmenting FDI involves a higher resource commitment but more stable revenue 
flows in the short-term (and hence lower risk exposure) than in-house development, and has 
higher expected returns in the long-term. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FDI DECISIONS 
Corporate governance refers to the set of institutional and market mechanisms that 
determine how firms are directed and controlled, how rights and responsibilities are divided 
among different stakeholders (including inter alia the shareholders, the managers, and the 
Board of Directors), and how corporate objectives are set and monitored. In their seminal work, 
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Berle & Means (1932) highlighted the separation of ownership and control in many firms, with 
the shareholders (the owners of the residual cash flows) typically delegating decision-making 
powers to a small group of professional, expert and committed managers. They also noted the 
prevalence in the United States, in the early part of the 20th Century, of widely-held firms in 
which share ownership was typically dispersed among large numbers of small shareholders, 
and in which effective control was thus exercised by the managers. 
This pattern of share ownership endures to a significant extent to this day in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and other countries with the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance. Share ownership is generally widely-dispersed, with low levels of State and family 
shareholdings though some significant institutional shareholdings. The rights of all 
shareholders, including minority shareholders are effectively protected by law. Firm managers 
are monitored by Boards, and incentivised through their remuneration schemes, to act in the 
interest of shareholders. And an active market for corporate control imposes discipline on all 
participants. The result is that shareholder wealth maximization may be assumed to be the 
paramount objective of firms in these countries, even if there are associated concerns about the 
impact on strategic decision-making of too much emphasis on short-term measures of financial 
success. 
Now all the traditional theories of the MNE have been developed with reference to the 
activities of MNEs headquartered in the United States and/or the United Kingdom, and their 
applicability to MNEs from other countries has only really been called into question since the 
arrival of EMNEs. It is thus understandable that these theorists have effectively ignored issues 
related to corporate governance, and implicitly assumed that all shareholders have a purely 
financial interest in their investments, that managers act as stewards on behalf of the 
shareholders (Davis et al, 1997), and have effectively conceptualised the firm as a risk-neutral 
decision-making entity motivated by short-term efficiency considerations. Strategy 
formulation is thus independent of the ownership structure of the firm, and managers are 
assumed to have a purely passive role merely reacting to environmental conditions. 
However, La Porta et al (1999) surveyed the ownership structures of a sample of the 
largest firms in twenty seven wealthy countries, and found that relatively few firms were 
widely-held. They reported that thirty percent of their sample of firms were family-controlled, 
eighteen percent were State-controlled, and five percent were controlled by financial 
institutions, but that the shares in only one-third of firms were widely-held. They also reported 
that widely-held firms were significantly less common in countries with poor shareholder 
protection – a common feature in many emerging economies. Other authors have since 
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undertaken similar analyses of firms in different parts of the world, and confirm that significant 
State, family, and financial institution share ownerships are the norm in most countries in the 
21st Century.  
Our contention is thus that a consideration of ownership structure (and other corporate 
governance factors) should be an essential feature of any general theory of the multinational 
enterprise, particularly given the distinction between asset-exploiting and asset-augmenting 
FDI highlighted in the previous section, and not just for EMNEs but also for MNEs from 
advanced economies. We outline below the elements of such a general theory, beginning with 
a discussion of the meaning of efficiency in a decision-making context. We then examine the 
objectives, decision-making time horizons, and attitudes towards risk of different types of 
shareholders and outline the (potentially divergent) interests of managers. 
 
On Efficiency 
We have argued above that all the main theories (implicitly or explicitly) assume that 
MNEs emerge as efficient responses to their competitive environments. But as Shubik (1978: 
121) emphasises, ‘efficiency has a multiplicity of meanings and interpretations to different 
individuals.’ He points out that there are various issues involved in understanding efficiency in 
a decision-making context including: 
 Are one or more groups or individuals involved? If there are more than one, are their 
objectives identical or do they differ? 
 Do the various groups and individuals understand enough of the alternatives available 
so that they are able to formulate reasonable objectives? 
 If the various groups and individuals are going to delegate the decision-making either 
implicitly or explicitly to others, do they trust the honesty and competence of the 
decision-makers? 
Now firms consist of many groups of stakeholders (including the shareholders and the top 
management team). Furthermore, in MNEs by definition, some individuals within these groups 
will be located in different countries. Thus it is necessary to consider inter alia the following 
factors in order to understand strategic decision-making in firms: 
 The varying objectives and resource commitments of the different stakeholders. 
 The appropriate time period, particularly as asset-exploiting FDI, asset-augmenting 
FDI and the in-house development of resources and capabilities typically do not yield 
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positive returns for some years. Are the different groups more interested in efficiency 
in the short-term or the long-term? 
 All firm, and especially MNE, operations involve various uncertainties so the strategies 
of the different stakeholders will also reflect their attitudes towards risk. Shubik (1978: 
124) notes that one of most important considerations that enters into risk behaviour is 
whether the individual(s) making the decisions are risking their own money or their 
livelihood.  
Shubik (1978: 122) thus concludes that ‘the idealization of efficient economic decision-making 
by a single individual is a far cry from reality’, and calls for an understanding of how overall 
corporate objectives are perceived, set and evaluated. In principle, corporate objectives – and 
the strategies to achieve them – should reflect the objectives of the shareholders. But, in most 
(especially large) firms, it is the top management team (TMT) that initiates and implements 
strategy, and the TMT may well pursue their own objectives. However, the scope for such 
managerial discretion may well be circumscribed by, on the one hand, powerful shareholders 
and, on the other hand, by an active market for corporate control and product market 
competition. 
  
The Shareholders 
We noted above that significant State, family, and financial institution share ownerships 
are the norm in many countries. Now such significant shareholders are unlikely to settle for a 
purely financial interest in their investments, and may be assumed to try and influence 
corporate (including FDI) strategy (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). There is a significant 
empirical literature confirming the effects of ownership structure on various FDI strategies. 
However, most of these studies focus on single emerging economies, and none consider FDI 
against its alternatives – which is the principal focus of this paper. 
State shareholders are an important constituency, not just in most emerging economies 
but also in many developed economies (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; La Porta et al; 1999; 
Claessens & Fan, 2002). UNCTAD (2013: 12) report that state-owned firms account for 80% 
of the stock market value in China, 62% in Russia, and 38% in Brazil. State-owned shares are 
typically not traded in many economies, so there is no threat of transfer of control. Furthermore, 
state-owned firms typically account for about one-tenth of global FDI flows (UNCTAD 2013: 
13). State ownership may be exercised at different levels of government, which will typically 
have different objectives and hence will try to influence firms in different ways. State behaviour 
may be ‘responsive’ to public pressures in some countries, notably in democratic advanced 
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countries where civil society is strong and governments are vulnerable to the political process 
and to the electoral cycle. But in many emerging and developing countries, State behaviour is 
more ‘autonomous’ of societal pressures, and key decisions may be taken by a small 
technocratic elite (Van de Walle, 2001). In ‘responsive’ countries, State shareholders will 
typically have objectives other that value-maximization, and these may militate against the 
expansion of overseas operations: these objectives may include the preservation of domestic 
employment or the channelling of benefits to those who can provide political support. Asset-
exploiting FDI involves expenditure (which has be to financed though taxation) and the returns 
come in the long-term, whilst licensing will be preferred as it involves an inflow to government 
coffers from the outset. Meanwhile, domestic development of assets and capabilities will entail 
greater domestic employment in the short-term and higher political approval, and will thus be 
preferred to asset-augmenting FDI. In summary, we would expect that State-owned firms in 
‘responsive’ countries, or firms where the State ownership is significant, are ceteris paribus 
likely to favour (a) licensing to asset-exploiting FDI, and (b) domestic in-house development 
activities to asset-augmenting FDI. In contrast, State shareholders in more ‘autonomous’ 
countries are more likely to have a longer-term perspective and to be less risk-averse. They 
may thus favour both asset-exploiting FDI and asset-augmenting FDI through the provision of 
financial and political support.  
Family shareholders are a second important constituency, not just in emerging 
economies but in most countries outside the Anglo-American orbit. Wooldridge (2015: 4-5) 
cites data from the Boston Consulting Group which show that family firms account for over 
50% of large firms in India and South-east Asia, about 45% in Brazil, about 40% in France and 
Germany, and 33% in the United States. Family shareholders may be reluctant to countenance 
both asset-exploiting and asset-augmenting FDI for several reasons. First, family-owned firms 
have different values and objectives than non-family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Family 
firms are often reluctant to embrace change, preferring stability and direct control (Claver et 
al, 2009). The more centralised decision-making in family firms may stymie international 
diversification strategies. Family firms may also be reluctant to invest overseas because 
international diversification typically involves higher debt levels which may mean a higher risk 
of loss of control. Higher levels of international diversification may require resources and 
expertise from external sources, and this too can dilute family control over firm strategy 
(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2010). Second, the assets of family shareholders are largely committed to 
the activities of the firm, whilst their equity holdings show limited liquidity. This means that 
family shareholders have a greater risk exposure than other shareholder constituencies, hence 
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they will tend to eschew the increased firm-specific systematic risk associated with FDI. Third, 
family-owned firms are often run as private businesses (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), to the 
disadvantage of minority shareholders particularly when there is weak institutional protection 
of shareholder rights. Scarce resources may be diverted away from potentially valuable 
initiatives such as FDI. On the other hand, family firms often have longer decision-making 
time horizons than non-family firms because the current generation of owners typically feel an 
obligation to preserve wealth for the next generation (Chrisman et al, 2005; Zellweger, 2007). 
On balance, however, we would expect that family-owned firms, or firms where family 
ownership is significant, are ceteris paribus likely to favour (a) licensing to asset-exploiting 
FDI, and (b) asset-augmenting FDI to domestic in-house development activities. 
Financial institutions are a third important shareholding constituency, particularly in 
more advanced economies. Equity participation by financial institutions may provide firms not 
only with additional financial resources but also with access to networks in overseas markets, 
and thus facilitate FDI directly (Gillan & Starks, 2003; Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Financial 
institutions will also typically have the expertise, independence, and motivation to monitor firm 
management, and ensure that they are pursuing strategies that maximise shareholder wealth 
maximization (Johnson et al, 2010). Furthermore, institutional shareholders are likely to have 
well-diversified portfolios, and thus to be effectively risk-neutral and more willing to accept 
the increased firm-specific risk exposure associated with asset-exploiting FDI. On the other 
hand, some financial institutions will have relatively short-term time horizons, and may thus 
favour strategies that generate returns in the shorter-term. Bushee (2004) identifies three 
categories of institutional investors: ‘transient’ investors which exhibit high portfolio turnover 
and which intensify the pressures for short-term performance, whilst ‘dedicated’ investors and 
‘quasi-indexers’ provide more stable ownership. On balance, however, we would expect that 
financial institution-owned firms, or firms where financial institution ownership is significant, 
are ceteris paribus likely to favour (a) asset-exploiting FDI to licensing, and (b) asset-
augmenting FDI to domestic in-house development activities. 
In many firms, State, family and institutional shareholders may co-exist with minority 
shareholders, and there may well be multiple and divergent influences on firm FDI strategy. 
Ownership structures may also be complicated inter alia by stock pyramids, cross-
shareholdings and dual-class shares which lead to divergences between control rights and cash-
flow rights, and which also give rise to potential principal-principal agency problems (Young 
et al, 2008). Firms may also be affiliated to business groups which are commonplace in many 
parts of the world: seventy percent of listed companies in Asia are group-affiliated and are 
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often family-controlled, whilst groups in advanced economies are often controlled by financial 
institutions (Claessens & Fan, 2002: 86). Group affiliation can facilitate FDI by allowing firms 
to tap into the group’s internal resources (managerial, financial, distribution channels etc), 
share costs and risks, provide cheaper and more ready access to external resources because of 
reputation benefits and/or privileged access, and also reduce transaction costs by providing 
networks of affiliated firms. 
 
The Top Management Team 
 Do the managers act as stewards on behalf of the shareholders? In firms where there is 
a controlling shareholder, then the TMT is likely to be staffed with insiders who promulgate 
the objectives of their sponsors. But if share ownership is widely-held by many small 
shareholders, then the TMT has effective control over strategic decision-making within the 
firm and it is possible that the TMT may pursue their own objectives notwithstanding the fact 
that they are supposed to be acting in the interest of the shareholders. This opportunistic 
behaviour is a manifestation of the well-known principal-agent problem (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Many of the characteristics of FDI projects (e.g. the one-off nature of most projects, the 
extended time periods, and the cross-border nature of the activities) and the associated 
uncertainties tend to give rise to information asymmetries and exacerbate these potential 
agency problems. Furthermore, agency problems worsen in countries where investor protection 
is weak. 
 Agency theory suggests several reasons why the managers might not always act in the 
interests of the shareholders. First, managers may pursue actions such as ‘empire building’ that 
create private benefits for themselves, even if they reduce shareholder value. Second, managers 
may favour a ‘quiet life’, and not exert as much effort as shareholders might wish (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2003). Third, and possibly of most significance in the current context, there is 
considerable evidence that managers are risk-averse often to the detriment of investment 
projects with uncertain outcomes. Amihud & Lev (1981) point out that managers’ incomes 
from their employment typically constitute a major portion of their total incomes. Their income 
is thus closely related to the performance of their firm, and that the firm’s failure to meet its 
performance targets may result in managers' losing their current employment and seriously 
hurting their future employment and earnings potential. Such employment risk cannot be 
effectively diversified by managers in their personal portfolios, hence risk-averse managers 
can therefore be expected to diversify this employment risk by promoting projects that stabilize 
the firm's income stream. They report (Amihud & Lev, 1981: 609-610) empirical evidence 
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suggesting that the behaviour of managers in manager-controlled firms is systematically 
different from that of managers in owner-controlled firms, and shows more intensive risk-
reduction activities. Thus, in situations where control and ownership are separated, managers 
may be expected to favour strategies with more stable cash flows and less risk, and which 
generate returns in the short-term as their rewards will typically be linked to short-term 
performance. There is a considerable literature devoted to the various ways in which managers 
can be encouraged to act in the shareholders’ interests. In her useful summary, Denis (2001) 
highlights various corporate governance mechanisms which she classifies as either bonding, 
monitoring, or incentive alignment solutions, but stresses that these mechanisms can reduce – 
but never completely eliminate - the principal-agent problem. The above discussion suggests 
that manager-controlled firms, or firms where the TMT enjoys considerable discretion, are 
ceteris paribus likely to favour (a) licensing to asset-exploiting FDI (because the associated 
income streams are more stable), and (b) asset-augmenting FDI to in-house development 
activities (because the associated income streams are more stable, and also because they would 
preside over a bigger empire).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Our objective in this paper is to make a contribution to the theory of the multinational 
enterprise and, in particular, to explain why firms undertake FDI rather than alternative 
strategies. We have argued that it is vital to distinguish between asset-exploiting FDI and asset-
augmenting FDI, as the alternative strategies available to the firm differ in each case and hence 
the rationales for FDI must also differ. We would aver that the market power theory, the 
evolutionary theory, and the eclectic paradigm all provide insightful explanations of asset-
exploiting FDI, but that attempts to extend them to accommodate asset-augmenting FDI have 
not been fruitful. Internalization theory and transaction cost theory provide explanations of 
which markets are likely to be internalized through both asset-exploiting FDI and asset-
augmenting FDI, but have little to say about who will internalize what activities. 
 We have further suggested that the traditional theories of the MNE all assume short-
term efficiency as the prime objective of the firm – whether it is efficiency in building up 
market share (market power theory), efficiency in exploiting FSAs overseas (evolutionary 
theory, eclectic paradigm), or efficiency in organizing the cross-border transfer of intermediate 
goods and services (internalization theory, transaction cost theory). Efficiency is a beguiling 
concept because it seems incontrovertible that all firms would prefer a more efficient outcome 
to a less efficient outcome. But efficiency in a decision-making context needs also to take 
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account of the varying objectives and resource commitments of the various stakeholders 
involved in making the decision, their attitudes towards risk, and their decision-making time 
horizons. The traditional theories of the MNE abstract away from such considerations, and 
implicitly assume that the firm is a risk-neutral decision-making entity with short-term 
objectives. This may be reasonable for firms with widely-dispersed shareholders and passive 
professional managers operating in countries with the Anglo-American system of corporate 
governance. But many firms operate under quite different systems of corporate governance, 
where concentrated shareholdings are commonplace, and markets for corporate control are 
weak or non-existent. Such systems are commonplace not just in most emerging and 
developing economies, but also in many advanced economies (e.g. Japan and Continental 
Europe). In such cases, the traditional theories fail to capture the full complexity of the FDI 
decision as they typically abstract away from the key features of the corporate governance 
systems in which the firms operate. FDI typically involves a substantial commitment of 
resources and uncertain returns spread over an extended time period, and hence has a high level 
of risk.  Different groups of shareholders (State, family, institutions) are likely to have different 
objectives, different attitudes towards risk, and different decision-making time horizons. All 
shareholders may favour efficiency, but their notions of efficiency are likely to be quite 
different and this will thus affect their decisions about whether or not to undertake FDI. Short-
term efficiency considerations may well play a role, but longer-term considerations may well 
be more important. The traditional theories of the MNE need to embrace this governance 
dimension. In a similar vein, Wooldridge (2015: 16) concludes that ‘the most intriguing 
challenge posed by the enduring success of the family company is to one of the building blocks 
of modern economics: the theory of the firm.’ 
 The ownership structure of the firm is the key corporate governance dimension in the 
context of strategic decision-making, though there are potential constraints. When share 
ownership is widely-held, the TMT may enjoy considerable managerial discretion with regard 
to the strategic initiatives it wishes to enact, and it may be unrealistic to assume that the 
managers act as disinterested stewards. Rather agency theory suggests that managers may have 
their own objectives and, if they have effective control of the firm, may pursue them even if 
they are counter to the interests of the shareholders. The information asymmetries inherent in 
FDI decisions, together with their infrequent occurrence of such projects and the long gestation 
periods, all provide fertile ground for managerial discretion and the associated agency 
problems. However, in firms whose shares are subject to active trading, the TMT is obliged to 
maintain a certain level of firm performance, otherwise they may be replaced or the firm itself 
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may become a takeover target (in which case a new TMT and/or directors may well be 
installed). Notwithstanding the fact that control contests are often time-consuming and 
expensive, the threat of losing control does impose on managers the discipline not to stray too 
far from pursuing strategies that maximise short-term returns (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Dalton 
et al, 2007). This discipline will be all the stronger in MNEs, especially those cross-listed on 
foreign equity markets, as there will be more potential buyers of the firm’s assets.  
But the markets for corporate control of many firms – in developing, emerging and 
advanced economies – are often far from active due to pyramid share structures, cross-
shareholdings, golden shares, voting agreements and the like, and particularly so in many 
family-controlled and/or State-controlled firms. For instance, Villalonga & Amit (2006) 
provide evidence to suggest that many family firms are effectively insulated from the market 
for corporate control. In such cases, the shareholders (and the TMT) are free to pursue whatever 
long-term or short-term objectives they choose, safe in the knowledge that there is no threat of 
transfer of control. 
 Product market competition too has a disciplinary impact upon firms (Machlup, 1967). 
In the long-term, organizational slack cannot persist in competitive markets, and managerial 
decisions should be close enough to those that should maximise the value of the firm. As 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997: 739) note, ‘product market competition is probably the most 
powerful force toward economic efficiency in the world’. But many MNEs operate in domestic 
industries characterised by imperfect competition (sustained by economies of scale, 
government interventions, barriers to market entry, product differentiation etc) and enjoy 
preferential access to many local resources.  In such cases, the firms have a degree of market 
power, short-term efficiency considerations will be less compelling, and the corporate 
governance influences over strategic decisions will tend to endure. 
  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Amihud, Y. & Lev, B. (1981). ‘Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers.’ Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2): 605-617. 
Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. (2003). ‘Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500.’ Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301-1327. 
Berle, A. & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: 
Macmillan. 
22 
 
 
Bertrand, M. & Mullainathan, S. (2003). ‘Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences.’ Journal of Political Economy, 111(5):1043-1075. 
Buckley, P.J. & Casson, M. (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise. London: 
Macmillan. 
Buckley, P.J. & Casson, M. (1998a). ‘Models of the multinational enterprise.’ Journal of 
International Business Studies, 29(1): 25-44. 
Buckley, P.J. & Casson, M.C. (1998b). ‘Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: extending 
the internalization approach.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 29(3): 539-
562. 
Buckley, P. & Strange, R. (2011). ‘The governance of the multinational enterprise: insights 
from internalisation theory.’ Journal of Management Studies, 48(2): 460-470. 
Bushee, B. (2004). ‘Identifying and attracting the “right” investors: evidence on the behaviour 
of institutional investors.’ Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 16(4): 28-35. 
Caves, R.E. (1971). ‘Industrial corporations: the industrial economics of foreign investment.’ 
Economica, 38(149): 1-27. 
Chari, M.D.R. (2012). ‘Business groups and foreign direct investment by developing country 
firms: an empirical test in India.’ Journal of World Business, 48(3): 349-359. 
Child, J. & Rodrigues, S.B. (2005). ‘The internationalization of Chinese firms: a case for 
theoretical extension?’ Management and Organization Review, 1(3): 381-410. 
Chiles, T.H. & McMackin, J.F. (1996). ‘Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and 
transaction cost economics.’ Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 73-99. 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., & Sharma, P. (2005). ‘Trends and directions in the development of 
a strategic management theory of the family firm.’ Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 29(3): 555-575. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. & Lang, L.H.P. (2000). ’The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations.’ Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2): 81-112. 
Claessens, S. and Fan, J.P.H. (2002). ‘Corporate governance in Asia: a survey.’ International 
Review of Finance, 3(2): 71-103. 
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P.H. & Lang, L.H.P. (2006). ‘The benefits and costs of group affiliation: 
evidence from East Asia.’ Emerging Markets Review, 7(1): 1-26. 
Claver, E., Rienda, L. & Quer, D. (2009). ‘Family firms’ international commitment: the 
influence of family-related factors.’ Family Business Review, 22(2): 125-135. 
Coase, R.H. (1937). ‘The nature of the firm.’ Economica, 4(16): 386-405. 
23 
 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). ‘Business groups and their types.’ Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 23(4): 419-437. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. & Genc, M. (2008). ‘Transforming disadvantages into advantages: 
developing country MNEs in the least developed countries.’ Journal of International 
Business Studies, 39(6): 957-979. 
Dalton, D.R., Hitt, M.A., Certo, S.T. & Dalton, C.M. (2007). ‘The fundamental agency 
problem and its mitigation: independence, equity and the market for corporate control.’ 
Academy of Management Annals, 1(1): 1-64. 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. & Donaldson, L. (1997). ‘Toward a stewardship theory of 
management.’ Academy of Management Review, 22(1): 20-47.   
Denis, D.K. (2001). ‘Twenty-five years of corporate governance research … and counting.’ 
Review of Financial Economics, 10(3): 191-212. 
Dunning, J.H. (1977). ‘Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: a search for an 
eclectic approach.’ In B. Ohlin, P.O. Hesselborn & P.M. Wijkman (eds), The 
international allocation of economic activity, pp.395-431. London: Macmillan. 
Dunning, J.H. (1979). ‘Explaining changing patterns of international production: in defence of 
the eclectic theory.’ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 41(4): 269-295. 
Dunning, J.H. (1980). ‘Toward and eclectic theory of international production: some empirical 
tests.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 11(1): 9-31. 
Dunning, J.H. (1988). ‘The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and 
some possible extensions.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1): 1-32. 
Dunning, J.H. (1995). ‘Reappraising the eclectic paradigm in the age of alliance capitalism.’ 
Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3): 461-493. 
Dunning, J.H. (2000a). ‘The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business 
theories of MNE activity.’ International Business Review, 9(1): 163-190. 
Dunning, J.H. (2000b). ‘The eclectic paradigm of international production: a personal 
perspective.’ In C.N. Pitelis & R. Sugden (eds), The nature of the transnational firm, 
pp.119-139. 
Dunning, J.H. & Rugman, A.M. (1985). ‘The influence of Hymer’s dissertation on the theory 
of foreign direct investment.’ American Economic Review, 75(2): 228-232. 
Dunning, J.H. & Lundan, S.M. (2008). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. 
Second edition. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Ferreira, M.A. & Matos, P. (2008). ‘The colors of investors’ money: the role of institutional 
investors around the world.’ Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3): 499-533. 
24 
 
 
Gillan, S.L. & Starks, L.T. (2003). ‘Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role 
of institutional investors: a global perspective.’ Journal of Applied Finance, 13(2): 4-
22. 
Gómez-Mejia, L.R., Makri, M. & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). ’Diversification decisions in 
family-controlled firms.’ Journal of Management Studies, 47(2): 224-252. 
Hennart, J-F. (1982). A theory of multinational enterprise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Hennart, J-F. (2001). ‘Theories of the multinational enterprise.’ In A.M. Rugman & T.L. 
Brewer (eds), The Oxford handbook of international business, pp.127-149. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hennart, J-F. (2009). ‘Down with MNE-centric theories! Market entry and expansion as the 
bundling of MNE and local assets.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 40(9): 
1432-1454. 
Hennart, J-F. (2012). ‘Emerging market multinationals and the theory of the multinational 
enterprise.’ Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 168-187. 
Hymer, S. (1960). The international operations of national firms: a study of direct investment. 
MIT Ph.D thesis.  
Hymer, S. (1968). ‘La grande firme multinationale.’ Revue Economique, 19(6): 949-973. 
Hymer, S. (1970). ‘The efficiency (contradictions) of multinational corporations.’ American 
Economic Review, 60(2): 441-448. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure’. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-360. 
Johnson, R.A., Schnatterly, K., Johnson, S.G. & Chiu, S.C. (2010). ‘Institutional investors and 
institutional environment: a comparative analysis and review.’ Journal of Management 
Studies, 47(8): 1590-1613. 
Khanna, T. & Palepu, K. (1997). ‘Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging 
economies.’ Harvard Business Review, 75(4): 41-49. 
Khanna, T. & Yafeh, Y. (2005). ‘Business groups and risk sharing around the world.’ Journal 
of Business, 78(1): 301-340. 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1969). American business abroad: six lectures on direct investment. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1993). ‘Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4): 625-645. 
25 
 
 
Kuemmerle, W. (1999). ‘The drivers of foreign direct investment into research and 
development: an empirical investigation.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 
30(1): 1-24. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (1999). ‘Corporate ownership around the 
world.’ Journal of Finance, 54(2): 471-517. 
Luo, Y. & Tung, R.L. (2007). ‘International expansion of emerging market enterprises: a 
springboard perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481-498. 
Machlup, F. (1967). ‘Theories of the firm: marginalist, behavioural, managerial.’ American 
Economic Review, 57(1): 1.33. 
Majocchi, A. & Strange, R. (2012). ‘International diversification: the impact of ownership 
structure, the market for corporate control and board independence.’ Management 
International Review, 52(6): 879-900. 
March, J.G. (1991). ‘Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.’ Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
Mathews, J.A. (2006). ‘Dragon multinationals: new players in 21st century globalization.’ Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 23(1): 5-27. 
McManus, J.C. (1972). ‘The theory of the international firm.’ In G. Paquet (ed), The 
multinational firm and the nation state, pp.66-93. Don Mills, Ontario: Collier-
Macmillan Canada 
Morck, R., Yeung, B. & Zhao, M. (2008). ‘Perspectives on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3): 337-350. 
Nagano, M. & Nguyen, P. (2012). ‘Board size and corporate risk taking: further evidence from 
Japan.’ Corporate Governance: an International Review, 20(4): 369-387. 
Pedersen, T. & Thomsen, S. (1997). ‘European patterns of corporate ownership: a twelve-
country study.’ Journal of International Business Studies, 28(4): 759-778. 
Ramamurti R. (2009). ‘What have we learned about emerging market MNEs?’ In R. 
Ramamurti & J.V. Singh (eds), Emerging multinationals in emerging markets, pp.399-
426. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rugman, A.M. (1981). Inside the multinationals: the economics of the multinational 
enterprise. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rugman A.M. (2009). Theoretical aspects of MNEs from emerging countries.’ In R. 
Ramamurti & J.V. Singh (eds), Emerging multinationals in emerging markets, pp.42-
63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
26 
 
 
Rugman, A.M. & Verbeke, A. (1990). Global Corporate Strategy and Trade Policy. 
Routledge: London, U.K. 
Shleifer, A. (1998). ‘State versus private ownership.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4): 
133-150. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1986). ‘Large shareholders and corporate control.’ Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3): 461-88. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1994). ‘Politicians and firms.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109(4): 995-1024. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1997). ‘A survey of corporate governance.’ Journal of Finance, 
52(2): 737-783. 
Shubik, M. (1978). ‘On concepts of efficiency.’ Policy Sciences, 9(2): 121-126. 
Teece, D.J. (1977). ‘Technology transfer by multinational firms: the resource cost of 
transferring technological know-how.’ Economic Journal, 87(346): 242-261. 
Teece, D.J. (1986). ‘Transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise: an 
assessment.’ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7(1): 21-45. 
Thomsen, S. and Pedersen, T. (2000). ‘Ownership structure and economic performance in 
largest European countries.’ Strategic Management Journal, 21(6): 689-705. 
UNCTAD (2006). World investment report 2006. FDI from developing and transition 
economies. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD (2013). World investment report 2013. Global value chains: investment and trade 
for development. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Van de Walle, N. (2001). African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1989. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). ‘How do family ownership, control, and management 
affect firm value?’ Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2): 385–417. 
Walsh, J.P. & Seward, J.K. (1990). ‘On the efficiency of internal and external control 
mechanisms.’ Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 421-458. 
Wooldridge, A. (2015). ‘To have and to hold.’ Special report: family companies. The 
Economist, 18 April.  
Wright, P., Ferris, S., Sarin, A. & Awasthi, V. (1996). ‘The impact of corporate insider, 
blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk-taking.’ Academy of 
Management Journal, 39(2): 441-463. 
27 
 
 
Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D. & Jiang, Y. (2008). ‘Corporate 
governance in emerging economies: a review of the principal-principal perspective.’ 
Journal of Management Studies, 45(1): 196-220. 
Zellweger, T. (2007). ‘Time horizon, cost of equity capital, and generic investment strategies 
of family firms.’ Family Business Review, 20(1): 1-15. 
 
